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It is important to preface this piece by advising the reader
that the author is not writing from the point of view of a
statistician, but rather that of a user of reliable change. The
author was invited to comment following the publication of
an original inquiry concerning Reliable Change Index (RCI)
formulae (Hinton-Bayre, 2000) and after acting as a reviewer
for the current Maassen paper (this issue, pp. 888–893).
Having been a bystander in the development of various RCI
methods, this comment serves to represent the struggle of a
non-statistician to understand the relevant statistical issues
and apply them to clinical decisions. When I first stumbled
across the ‘classical’ RCI attributed to Jacobson and Truax
(1991) (Maassen, this issue, Equation 4), I was quite excited
and immediately applied the formula to my own data
(Hinton-Bayre et al., 1999). Later, upon reading the Temkin
et al. (1999) paper I commented on what seemed to be an
inconsistency in their calculation of the error term (Hinton-
Bayre, 2000). My “confusion” as Maassen suggests was
derived from the fact that I noted the error term used was
based on the standard deviation of the difference scores
(Maassen, Expression 5*) rather than the Jacobson and Truax
formula (Maassen, Expression 4). This apparent anomaly
was subsequently addressed when Temkin et al. (2000)
explained they had employed the error term proposed by
Christensen and Mendoza (1986) (Maassen, Expression 5).
My concern with the Maassen manuscript was that it ini-
tially appeared two separate values could be derived through
using expressions 5 and 5* using the Temkin et al. (1999)
data. This suggested there might be four (expressions 4, 5,
5*, and 6), rather than three, ways to calculate the reliable
change error term based on a null hypothesis model. Once
again I was confused. Only very recently did I discover that
expressions 5 and 5* yield identical results when applied to
the same data set (N.R. Temkin, personal communication)
and when estimated variances are used (G. Maassen, per-
sonal communication). The reason for expressions 5 and 5*
yielding slightly different error term values using the Temkin
et al. (1999) data was due to use of nonidentical samples for
parameter estimation. The use of non-identical samples came
to light in the review process of the present Maassen paper—
which Maassen now indicates in an author’s note. Thus
there were indeed only three approaches to consider (Expres-
sions 4, 5, & 6). Nonetheless, Maassen maintains (personal
communication) that Expression 5, as elaborated by Chris-
tensen and Mendoza (1986), represents random errors com-
prising the error distribution of a given person, whereas
Expression 5* refers to the error distribution of a given
sample. While it seems clear on the surface that the expres-
sions represent separate statistical entities, it remains unclear
to the present author how these expressions can then yield
identical values when applied to test–retest data derived
from a single normative group. Unfortunately however, my
confusion does not stop there.
It is readily appreciable that the RCIJT (Expression 4) is
relevant when only pretest data and a reliability estimate
are available and no true change is expected (including no
practice effect). When pre- and posttest data are available
in the form of test–retest normative data it seems sensible
that posttest variance be included also. Expression 6 appears
a neat and efficient method of incorporating posttest vari-
ance. And, according to Maassen, it remains so whether or
not pre- and posttest variances are believed to be equivalent
in the population (see also Abramson, 2000). Given that
test–retest correlations will always be less than unity, if
measurement error alone accounts for regression to the mean,
then pre-and posttest variances should not differ (Maassen,
personal communication). Maassen suggests that differ-
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ences between pre- and posttest variances can be attributed
to differential practice. This is explained through reference
to fanspread and regression to the mean where a relation-
ship (positive or negative) is seen between pretest scores
and individual practice effects.
Expression 5 also appears to incorporate posttest vari-
ability. The two expressions differ in how they purport to
account for the presence of a ‘differential practice effect.’
The differential practice effect is the extra variation added
by the individual’s true difference score ~Di ! and their
practice effect ~Pi !—see the expression following Expres-
sion 7 (Maassen, this issue). Temkin (this issue) appears
to argue that the individual practice effect cannot be known,
and thus differential practice effect is estimated in the
numerator of the expression comparing pre- and posttest
scores. Moreover, as differential practice is estimated it
should be incorporated into the error term as provided by
Expression 5. Maassen argues that an individual’s posttest
score is in part affected by an individual differential prac-
tice effect, thus this ‘extra’ element of variance is not
required in the error term. Maassen asserts that it has already
been taken into account through incorporating posttest vari-
ance. Temkin maintains that individual differential prac-
tice effects are excluded from the Maassen error term. It
must be remembered that when pre- and posttest variances
are equal, the two error estimates will be identical—there
would be no differential practice effect according to
Maassen.
The discrepancy between estimates becomes increas-
ingly pronounced as the pre- and posttest variance esti-
mates differ and as the reliability improves (see Maassen,
Expression 7). Given that clinical decisions should not be
made using results taken from unreliable measures, the
present author sees the reliability component as a lesser
concern in practice. Clinically one could argue that a relia-
bility of r . .90 is a minimum for assisting in decisions
regarding any individual’s performance. Moreover, to derive
RCI cut scores using measures with reliability estimates
r , .70 will yield intervals so wide as to be clinically use-
less in many cases. The RCI should not be considered a
correction for the use of an unreliable measure. Thus, clin-
ically speaking, the emphasis rests more squarely on the
differences between pre- and posttest variances and the sub-
sequent effects on the error term under Expressions 5 and 6.
The above comments are not restricted to the use of
Expression 6, but also apply, at least in part, to Expres-
sion 5. The Temkin et al. (1999) approach obviously affords
greater protection against type 1 errors in decision-making
(false positives). To what extent the adjustment is valid is
still obviously under conjecture. There is an obvious clini-
cal appeal to evaluating whether the difference score obtained
by a person suspected of change is ‘unusual’ when com-
pared to a normative set of difference scores from those not
expected to change (Expression 5*). This is akin to deter-
mining impairment via simple standard (Z or T) scores as
commonly done with neuropsychological tests. Yet, Temkin
and colleagues’ approach might be criticized as a departure
from the accepted standard error of measurement approach
that Maassen continues to advocate.
Maassen suggests that Expression 6 yields a better esti-
mate than Expression 5 in any circumstance, and illustrated
the discrepancy between error terms for McSweeny et al.’s
(1993) PIQ data. This comparison seems fair, as the distri-
bution of scores was presumably normal. What is not known
is how did this 8% difference in the magnitude of error
affect the false positive rate in real terms. A point investi-
gated more directly below. The 25% discrepancy in magni-
tude of error noted between expressions on Temkin et al.’s
(1999) TPT total scores are of lesser interest. Given that
neither method will yield acceptable false positive rates
when data is obviously skewed in a large sample it would
seem prudent to operate on distribution-free based intervals.
The evolution of various forms of RCI has been a chal-
lenge to follow. The interested clinician has been forced to
grapple with a multitude of parameter-based expressions
attempting to best account for error in its various forms. If
there is ever a need for the bridge between academia and
clinical practice to be built, then this is surely one of those
occasions. Ultimately the clinician needs a method that reli-
ably and validly allows for an interpretation of individual
change. The question remains however, which one do we
choose? This was when I realized my confusion had still
not abated. Adopting a statistically conservative approach
one might employ the sometimes wider Expression 5 esti-
mate, yet actual change might be missed. This could occur
when making a before-after comparison as seen in the case
of brain surgery, or when wishing to plot recovery in an
already affected group, such as following progress after
brain injury. But of course this must be balanced against the
possible decision errors stemming from the use of the some-
times narrower Expression 6 estimate. Clearly, this is not an
issue that should be resolved solely through reference to the
relative importance of decision errors.
Thus, in comparing the two approaches for estimating
the RCI error term, one should consider psychometric, sta-
tistical, applied, and clinical elements. On a psychometric
level, the difference appears to depend on whether the error
variance should reflect what is unusual for that person
(Expression 6) or whether that person is unusual (Expres-
sion 5*). Classical psychometric theory would suggest the
concept represented by Expression 6 is preferable. How-
ever, the present author still cannot see how if Expressions
5 and 5* yield the same value when derived from a single
group retested (as would be done using retest norms), that
Expression 5 (and thus 5*) does not also represent an esti-
mate of individual error. On a statistical level, the differ-
ence between methods appears to hinge on the management
of differential practice in the error term. It seems reason-
able that Expression 6 would be preferred when no differ-
ential practice or true change was present. Yet, one must
remember that under such circumstances the two expres-
sions will agree. Moreover, it does seem clear that one can-
not always readily determine whether differential practice
is present, as will be demonstrated below. On an applied
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level, the question becomes which method, if either, is desir-
able when systematic practice effects are known to occur. It
stands to reason also that if pretest scores can predict prac-
tice (or posttest scores) so too can other factors. Further on
this point, if one refers to Temkin et al. (1999) Table 5
(p. 364), it can be seen that the error terms for the regres-
sion based models—both simple and multiple—are nar-
rower than the Maassen prediction intervals (SED 3 1.645)
for Expression 6 (excepting simple linear regression for
PIQ). Prima facie this seems to suggest that more than just
pretest scores may be relevant to determining posttest scores
or practice. Maassen himself refers to other works when
discussing how to deal with practice effects using either
mean adjustments (Chelune et al., 1993) or regression based
reliable change models (McSweeny et al., 1993; Temkin
et al., 1999). It is not clear how the proposed adjustment to
error made by Expression 6, compares conceptually to the
seemingly more versatile and efficient regression-based mod-
els. This is an important point as practice effects are a fre-
quent concern when conducting repeated testing on
performance based measures that are commonly used in
neuropsychological assessment. To this end, it is unclear
whether the present Maassen error term (Expression 6) is
preferred in those frequent instances where systematic prac-
tice effects are at work. Finally, and arguably most impor-
tantly, on a clinical level, it is worth considering whether
the use of one method over another yields demonstrable
differences in false positive rates. To further address the
latter issue, Expressions 5 and 6 were applied to previously
published data to examine the rate of significant change on
retesting in a sample where change was not expected.
A normative series of 43 young male athletes were tested
twice (preseason) at a retest interval of 7–14 days on the
written versions of the Digit Symbol Substitution test of
the Wechsler scales, the Symbol Digit Modalities test, and
the Speed of Comprehension test (Hinton-Bayre et al., 1997).
These data were fortuitous as across the three measures
reliability estimates were all r . .70, yet the magnitude of
the difference between test and retest variances was not
consistent (see Table 1), thereby providing an extra exam-
ple of how such differences may affect error and sub-
sequent classification of change. Significant mean practice
effects were found on Digit Symbol and Speed of Compre-
hension, but not the Symbol Digit, using repeated measures
t tests (see Table 1). Variance estimates were equivalent on
Digit Symbol, with an estimated disattenuated regression
coefficient (est. bC ! approximating one. Maassen indicated
bC 5 bc /rxx , in this instance bc was estimated where rxy
was substituted for rxx as a measure of pretest reliability.
Not surprisingly, the error terms derived for Expressions 5
and 6 differed only at the fourth decimal place. When using
the RCI adjusting for mean practice (Chelune et al., 1993)
an equal number of participants were classified as having
changed significantly based on each expression (see Table 1),
at rates consistent with chance using a 90% level of confi-
dence (overall rate 11.6%). Pretest scores were found to
correlate negatively with difference scores (posttest 2 pre-
test) suggesting regression to the mean. On the Symbol
Digit, the standard deviations for Times 1 and 2 were more
discrepant, with posttest variance less than pretest variance
(thus est. bC , 1). A stronger negative correlation was seen
between pretest and difference scores on Symbol Digit (see
Table 1). Expression 5 produced an interval 3.6% larger
than Expression 6 and classified 5 participants (11.6%) as
significantly changing, whereas the marginally narrower
Expression 6 identified 2 additional participants as having
significantly improved (overall rate 16.3%). Yet both the
extras only recorded z 5 1.649, and thus barely reached
significance (90% C.I. 5 61.645), and might have been
overlooked if intermediate calculations were rounded and
would possibly only be judged clinically changed in the
context of other test changes. On the Speed of Comprehen-
Table 1. Test–retest data and reliable change estimates for a normative sample of male
athletes (N 5 43)
DSS SDM SOC
Time 1, M(SD) 60.19 (12.77) 57.16 (12.56) 52.49 (16.48)
Time 2, M(SD) 66.42 (12.72) 59.58 (9.95) 63.47 (19.26)
RM t ( p) 5.26 ( p , 0.001) 1.86 ( p 5 0.07) 5.46 ( p , 0.001)
rX.Y 0.814 0.736 0.739
rX.Y-X 20.310* 20.614* 20.190
est. bC 0.997 0.792 1.169
Expression 5 (Sdiff ! 7.7670 8.5363 13.1828
Expression 6 (SED ! 7.7669 8.2369 12.9640
Regression (SEE) 7.4746 6.8188 13.1460
Improved (Sdiff /SED /SEE ! a 20202 20403 30303
Deteriorated (Sdiff /SED0SEE) a 30302 30304 20202
Note. SDM5Symbol Digit Modalities, DSS5Digit Symbol Substitution, SOC5Speed of Comprehension.
RM t 5 repeated measures t test, rX.Y 5test–retest correlation, rX.Y2X 5 correlation between pretest and
difference scores, est. bC 5estimated disattenuated regression coefficient.
aNumber of participants changed based on 90% confidence interval, adjusting for practice.
*p , .05 (two-tailed)
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sion, posttest variance was larger than pretest variance (thus
est. bC . 1). In this instance Expression 5 error was only
1.7% larger than Expression 6 error. Again classification
rates were equal for both expressions and consistent with
chance. However, the correlation between pretest and dif-
ference scores failed to reach significance (see Table 1).
In summary, the error terms derived from Expressions 5
and 6 in a new set of data were comparable in magnitude,
and similar false positive classification rates were observed.
The only classification discrepancy was seen on the Sym-
bol Digit, where the difference between pre- and posttest
variances was greatest. The apparent increase in false pos-
itives for Expression 6 on the Symbol Digit should not be
overstated given the small sample size and borderline nature
of the additional cases noted as changing. Replications con-
trasting the two methods using large sets of real data would
be more convincing that any clinical differences observed
here are more real than apparent.
It was observed that, as pretest variance exceeded post-
test variance, the relationship between pretest and differ-
ence scores became increasingly negative. In other words,
relatively greater pretest variance was linked to more obvi-
ous regression to the mean. Maassen stated, “If bC 5 1,
there is no better estimation for all the practice effects in the
normative population than the population mean (for prac-
tice) pc ,” or that differential practice effects are not present.
When est. bC approximated 1 as was seen with the Digit
Symbol, there was still a significant negative relationship
between pretest and difference scores, suggesting regres-
sion to the mean should be due to measurement error. It was
also noted that when est. bC , 1, regression to the mean
was greater still, suggesting regression to the mean due to
differential practice effects and measurement error. More-
over, when est. bC . 1, neither regression to the mean nor
fanspread was observed. These findings may reflect the sub-
stitution of rxy for rxx , but no other estimate for pretest
reliability is practically available for most timed perfor-
mance measures. Maassen (personal communication) has
suggested that as rxy is a lower-bound estimate of rxx , the
values derived for est. bC will be overestimates. For exam-
ple, the true value of bC on Digit Symbol would be less
than 1, suggesting the effects of differential practice on top
of measurement error in producing regression to the mean.
On the Symbol Digit, bC would be further below one sug-
gesting a stronger role of differential practice on regression
to the mean for that measure. The true Speed of Compre-
hension bC would more closely approximate one and thus
differential practice would not be expected, thus making it
less likely to see a relationship between pretest and differ-
ence scores. These data support the notion that regression
to the mean affects posttest scores and thus needs to be
taken into account. It also supports the understanding of
independence between differential practice and measure-
ment error as contributors to regression to the mean. The
difficulty arises from the realization that as rxx cannot be
readily obtained in most instances for performance based
measures. It is subsequently difficult to estimate bC and
thus determine whether differential practice effects exist. In
this way, the relative contributors of any regression to the
mean cannot be determined. As for which of Expressions 5
and 6 best achieves protection against regression to the mean
when systematic practice effects exist may be moot, given a
better understanding of regression-based RCI.
Regression based analyses were conducted for the sake
of comparison, given the presence of mean practice and
possible differential practice effects observed in the mea-
sures. RC scores were calculated using the following for-
mulae based on McSweeny et al. (1993) and Temkin et al.
(1999):
Y ’ 5 bX 1 a
SEE 5 SYM1 2 r 2
RCI 5
Y 2 Y ’
SEE
,
where X 5 pretest score, Y 5 actual posttest score, Y ’ 5
predicted posttest score, b 5 slope of the least squares regres-
sion line of Y on X, a 5 intercept, SEE 5 standard error of
estimate, SY 5 estimated standard deviation of posttest
scores, and r 2 5 the squared correlation coefficient.
Not surprisingly, when regression to the mean was great-
est (Symbol Digit), the regression-based error term was con-
siderably smaller than the error terms from either Expression
5 or 6 (see Table 1). The proportional reduction in error
seen when variances were equal (Digit Symbol) was much
less pronounced. Further, the SEE was not the smallest error
estimate when the regression to the mean was not signifi-
cant (Speed of Comprehension). Interestingly, the classifi-
cation rates based on the regression model with SEE were
not remarkably different than rates seen with Expressions 5
and 6. It was noted that the relatively higher number of
false positives on Symbol Digit using the SEE were seen in
participants with more extreme pre- or posttest scores com-
pared to the rest of the group. The regression model accounts
for regression to the mean when present and subsequently
provides a smaller error estimate. However, it would appear
that the simple regression based model (in its current form)
might not necessarily provide the most efficient error term
when regression to the mean is not clearly evident, nor
improve false positive rates. A multiple regression model
was not investigated here given the small sample, and sub-
sequent instability of predictors.
It must be noted that the results presented above focus
more on apparent trends and may possibly reflect idiosyn-
crasies of the data. Nonetheless, the results further suggest
that the practical difference between the error term values
obtained from Expressions 5 and 6 will most often be neg-
ligible. This reflects data presented by Temkin et al. (1999)
and McSweeny et al. (1993). This is not to imply that either
expression will suffice, as ultimately the best estimate of
error should be used in any instance. Concordantly, rather
Comment on Maassen RC index 897
https://doi.org/10.1017/S1355617704106103
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UQ Library, on 10 Aug 2017 at 03:23:34, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms.
than endorsing either Expression 5 or 6, the present author
awaits further consideration of the regression based mod-
els, particularly in comparison to the approaches discussed
here when practice effects are evident (e.g., Maassen, 2003;
Temkin et al., 1999).
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